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Abstract—The k-anonymity approach adopted by k-Same face 
de-identification methods enables these methods to serve their 
purpose of privacy protection. However, it also forces every k 
original faces to share the same de-identified face, making it 
impossible to track individuals in a k-Same de-identified video. 
To address this issue, this paper presents an approach to the 
creation of distinguishable de-identified faces. This new approach 
can serve privacy protection perfectly whilst producing de-
identified faces that are as distinguishable as their original faces. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the recent years, a growing number of service 
providers are starting to share and utilize multimedia content 
for research, business, security and many other purposes. For 
example, surveillance footages are often used as evidence in 
law enforcement. Healthcare homes are sharing videos of 
patients to conduct analysis of common symptoms as well as to 
inform research for better diagnoses and treatments. Online 
storage and sharing of personal images and videos have 
become an integral part of the modern, mobile life in the Cloud 
age. However, this evolvement has inevitably ignited concerns 
about the privacy of information in the course of storing and/or 
distributing such data. This growing concern and the associated 
legal and ethical responsibilities have led to considerable 
interest and effort in the field of face de-identification over the 
last decade. The aim of face de-identification is to conceal the 
original identities of the faces captured in a given image or 
video with new facial identities generated synthetically. 
To date, the most cited face de-identification methods are 
solutions in the k-Same family, where privacy protection is 
achieved by implementing the theory of k-anonymity [1]. 
Examples of k-Same algorithms include k-Same-Pixels [2], k-
Same-Eigen [2], k-Same-M [3] and k-Same-furthest [4]. In a k-
Same face de-identification process, the set of original face 
images is firstly partitioned into clusters of size k. For each 
cluster formed, an aggregate face is then used to de-identify all 
the k members in the cluster. In other words, each group of k 
original faces would share the same de-identified face and 
hence the name ‘k-Same’ for this family of methods. Typically, 
the performance of a face de-identification method is evaluated 
in terms of the recognition rate of its de-identified faces against 
the originals. The lower the recognition rate, the better the 
privacy protection is. As each de-identified face is replicated k 
times for all the originals in its cluster and each de-identified 
face can only be matched with one original during recognition, 
the correct matching for each de-identified face can at best be 1 
in k times.  This k-anonymity approach has enabled k-Same 
methods to guarantee a recognition rate lower than 1/k while 
this guaranteed recognition rate has been further reduced to 
zero, i.e. perfect privacy protection has been achieved, by the 
k-Same-furthest method [4] - a new addition to the k-Same 
family. 
Although the k repetition of each de-identified sample has 
enabled the k-Same methods to serve their purpose of privacy 
protection, the repetition also makes the k-Same de-identified 
faces undistinguishable. To be more specific, several different 
individuals will appear to be the same person, making it 
impossible to track an individual in a k-Same de-identified 
video. To address this common drawback of k-Same methods, 
this paper presents a new method for face de-identification. 
This new method guarantees perfect privacy protection by 
adopting the approach of the k-Same-furthest method, while 
facilitating the provision of unique distinguishable de-
identified faces across all individuals.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 
2 reviews the k-Same framework and the k-Same-furthest 
method. Section 3 describes the new distinguishable face de-
identification method and proves that this new method can 
always achieve a zero recognition rate. Section 4 evaluates the 
proposed algorithm’s ability to protect privacy through 
experiments and compare the diversity of the de-identified face 
images with that of the originals. Finally, the findings of this 
work are summarized and further discussed in Section 5. 
II. K-SAME DE-IDENTIFICATION 
A. Face De-identification Definition and Notations 
To facilitate comparisons, this paper adopts the notations 
from Newton et al.’s paper [1] on the first k-Same method. 
This set of notations has been used in many succeeding 
publications on face de-identification, including the k-Same-
furthest method [4]. The definition of face de-identification 
given in [1] is quoted here. 
Definition Face De-identification (Definition 2.6 in [1]). 
Let ۶ and ۶ୢ be face sets, Γ א ۶, Γୢ א ۶ୢ, ݂: ۶ ՜ ۶ୢ be a 
function that attempts to conceal the identity of the subject of 
the original face image; and, ݂ሺΓሻ ൌ Γୢ  but Γ ് Γୢ  (element-
wise). ݂ is termed face de-identification. Γୢ  is a de-identified 
image. 
B. k-Same-furthest Face De-identification 
The k-Same’s guarantee of a recognition rate lower than 1/k 
is achieved by replicating each Γୢ  k times regardless of the 
clustering of ۶ [2]. This implies that even random clustering 
would not affect the effectiveness of k-Same in terms of 
privacy protection. However, to minimize information loss, all 
k-Same methods form clusters in ۶ with homogeneous faces 
[1] and calculate each de-identified face Γୢ  as the average of a 
cluster. 
The k-Same-furthest paper named all the k-Same methods 
prior to it ‘k-Same-closest’. This is due to the fact that all these 
methods de-identify an original face with the centroid of its 
own cluster (i.e. the cluster that is closest to the origial face). 
However, instead of maximizing the loss/removal of identity 
information, this approach actually minimizes identity loss. 
When no overlapping exists between any two clusters, the 
algorithms will always lead to a recognition rate equal to the 
theoretical maximum of 1/k. When overlapping exists between 
two clusters the centroid of a cluster can be closest to an 
original face from the overlapping cluster, reducing the 
recognition rate of k-Same-closest in such special cases. This is 
confirmed by the experimental results published for the k-
Same-closest methods where their recognition rates tend to stay 
just below the 1/k curve. To maximize the removal of identity 
information in the original face images, the k-Same-furthest 
method de-identifies each original image Γ א ۶ with the 
average of the cluster that is, identity-wise, furthest away from 
it. The k-Same-furthest de-identification process is iterative. In 
each iteration, two clusters are formed and de-identified with 
the average of the other cluster.  The clustering process in k-
Same-furthest ensures a maximum distance between these two 
clusters. Fig. 1 illustrates an iteration of the k-Same-furthest de-
identification process with a 2D data set. To best serve its goal 
of privacy protection, this approach is adopted here in the 
proposed method for the purpose of achieving perfect privacy 
protection with the de-identified faces. 
 
 
Fig. 1. An iteration of the k-Same-furthest de-identificaiton process with an 
example data set, where original samples Λ௙௜ in cluster ۱௙ are de-identified as 
Λ௖തതത (the centroid of cluster ۱௖) and original samples  Λ௖௜  in ۱௖ are de-
identified as Λ௙തതത (the centroid of cluster ۱௙). ݅ ൌ 1,2, . . ݇ with ݇ ൌ 4 here. 
 
III. DISTINGUISHABLE DE-IDENTIFIED FACES  
A. The propsed k-Diff-furthest Algorithm 
This section presents an approach to distinguishable de-
identified faces. On the one hand, it adopts the iterative process 
of k-Same-furthest in terms of forming two clusters of size k in 
each iteration and swapping their centroids. On the other hand, 
instead of de-identifying each complete cluster with the same 
face, this new approach generates a unique (different) de-
identified face for each of the k original faces in a cluster. It is 
hence named k-Diff-furthest. Fig. 2 outlines the process flow of 
the proposed k-Diff-furthest algorithm. 
Algorithm: k-Diff-furthest(۶, ݇) 
Inputs:
Output:
A person specific face set ۶ and the privacy constraint ݇, with 
|۶| ൒ 2݇ 
An Active Appearance Model  ΑΑΜሺ·ሻ 
De-identified face set ۶ୢand its AAM projection ۻୢ
Uses:
A face cluster ۱௖ ൌ ሼΛ௖௜ሽ with a centroid at Λ௖തതത and a radius of ݎ௖, 
a face cluster ۱௙ ൌ ሼΛ௙௜ሽ with a centroid at Λ௙തതത and a radius of ݎ௙, 
and dist൫Λ௖തതത, Λ௙തതത൯ which is the distance between Λ௖തതത and Λ௙തതത. 
Steps: 
1 ۶ୢ ൌ ׎ 
2 ۻ ൌ ΑΑΜሺ۶ሻ, ۻୢ ൌ ׎  
3 For each Λ௜ א ۻ do: 
4  ۱௖ ൌ Λ௜ , and remove Λ௜  from ۻ 
5  Λ௖തതത ൌ Λ௜  
6  Select from ۻ the face Λ௙ଵ that is furthest away from Λ௜  
7  ۱௙ ൌ Λ௙ଵ, and remove Λ௙ଵ from ۻ 
8  Λ௙തതത ൌ Λ௙ଵ 
9  While |۱௖| ൏ ݇ and ห۱௙ห ൏ ݇ do: 
10  Select from ۻ the face Λ௙ that is closest to Λ௙തതത 
11  Add Λ௙ to ۱௙ 
12  Select from ۻ the face Λ௖  that is closest to Λ௖തതത 
13  Add Λ௖  to ۱௖ 
14  Update Λ௖തതത, Λ௙തതത, ݎ௖, ݎ௙ and dist൫Λ௖തതത, Λ௙തതത൯  
15  If dist൫Λ௖തതത, Λ௙തതത൯ ൏ ݎ௖ ൅ ݎ௙ then  
16   Remove Λ௙ from ۱௙ 
17   Remove Λ௖  from ۱௖ 
18   Update Λ௙തതത and Λ௖തതത 
19   Break from while loop 
20  Endif 
21  Remove Λ௙ and Λ௖  from ۻ 
22  Loop 
23  If |ۻ| ൑ 2 then 
24  If distሺΛ௜, Λ௖തതതሻ ൐ distሺΛ௜, Λ௙തതതሻ 
25   Add Λ௜  to ۱௙ and remove Λ௜  from ۻ 
26  Else
27   Add Λ௜  to ۱௖ and remove Λ௜  from ۻ 
28  Endif
29  Endif 
30  ΔΛ ൌ Λ௖തതത െ Λ௙തതത 
31  For each Λ௖௜ א ۱௖  do: 
32  Compute Λୢ ൌ Λ௖௜ െ ΔΛ 
33  Add Λୢ to ۻୢ to de-identify Λ௖௜  
34  Next 
35  For each Λ௙௜ א ۱௙ do: 
36  Compute Λୢ ൌ Λ௙௜ ൅ ΔΛ 
37  Add Λୢ to ۻୢ to de-identify Λ௙௜  
38  Next 
39 Next 
40 ۶ௗ ൌ ΑΑΜିଵሺۻௗሻ 
Fig. 2. The process flow of the proposed k-Diff-furthest algorithm. 
The proposed k-Diff-furthest algorithm transforms the 
given person-specific face set ۶ from the RGB pixel-based 
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space to a pre-trained Active Appearance Model (AAM) [5, 6] 
feature space where all the faces are aligned to a common face. 
It has been shown that representing original faces in an AAM 
space and performing face de-identification there can prevent 
ghost artefacts in the de-identified face effectively [3]. The 
AAM representation of the original face set ۶ is denoted as ۻ 
and its de-identified version as ۻୢ. 
As shown in Fig. 2, the k-Diff-furthest process is iterative. 
Like the k-Same-furthest method, k-Diff-furthest completes 
two tasks in each iteration. The first task is to form two clusters 
۱௖ and ۱௙ in ۻ for the given original face Λ௜ , where Λ௜  is the 
trigger of the current iteration and ۱௖ is formed with faces 
closest to Λ௜  while ۱௙ with those furthest from it. Once an 
original face is assigned to a cluster, it is removed from ۻ. The 
second task of each iteration is to generate a de-identified face 
Λୢ for each original in ۱௖ and ۱௙.  
In order to achieve a privacy protection level guaranteed to 
be better than 1/݇, all the k-Same-closest methods [4] demand 
that each cluster formed in the de-identification process must 
contain at least k members. In contrast to these methods, k-
Same-furthest guarantees perfect privacy protection regardless 
of the value of k, by preventing overlapping between the two 
clusters formed in each iteration. k-Diff-furthest adopts this 
same approach and guarantees perfect privacy protection 
regardless of the value of k. Whenever a new member is added 
to the two clusters ۱௖ and ۱௙ each, k-Diff-furthest checks to see 
whether overlapping is caused by these two new members (line 
15). If so, both new members are removed from their clusters 
and the clustering loop for both ۱௖ and ۱௙ is stopped as adding 
any other remaining face to ۱௖ or ۱௙ would cause even more 
overlapping between the two clusters. As a result, the size of 
the clusters formed in the k-Diff-furthest process might be 
smaller than k. Part B of this section proves the effectiveness of 
this approach in terms of privacy protection.  
To maximize identity loss, k-Same-furthest de-identifies the 
originals in ۱௖ and ۱௙ by swapping the cluster centers. Whilst 
the same approach is adopted in k-Diff-furthest, the two 
methods differ in the way how the de-identified faces are 
computed. The k-Same-furthest algorithm implements k-
anonymity and uses the average of one cluster as the de-
identified face for all the faces in the other cluster. Lines 30-39 
in Fig. 2 details how the de-identified faces are computed in k-
Diff-furthest. As detailed by the pseudo code in Fig. 2 and 
illustrated by the example in Fig. 3, the de-identification step in 
k-Diff-furthest is equivalent to moving original faces Λ௜  in ۱௖ 
to their new centroid Λ௙തതത with their relative locations to the 
centroid unchanged, i.e. 
 vector ሺΛ௖തതതΛ௜ሻ՜ ൌ Λ௙തതതΛୢሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬሬԦ (1). 
The same applies to the original faces in ۱௙. Through this 
approach, k-Diff-furthest generates a unique de-identified face 
for each original face in ۶ and retains the diversity of ۶ in ۶ୢ. 
As it is assumed that original faces in ۶ are distinguishable, k-
Diff-furthest ensures that the de-identified faces in ۶ୢ are 
equally distinguishable. 
 
Fig. 3. Computation of the de-identified face Λୢ௜ for an original face Λ௜in the 
k-Diff-furthest process, illustrated with a simplified example in a 2D space. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Illustration of Theorem 1 in a 2D space.  
B. Correctness of the k-Diff-furthest Algorithm 
Theorem 1. Given a privacy constraint ݇ ൐ 1; a person-
specific face set ۶ with |۶| ൒ 2݇; and a face set ۶ௗ ൌ
k-Diff-furthestሺ۶, ݇ሻ, k-Diff-furthestሺሻ is effective with 
respect to the following claim for any face image Γௗ ൌ
k-Diff-furthestሺΓ, ݇ሻ for Γ א ۶: 
Given that k-Diff-furthestሺሻ uses distሺ߁ଵ,  ߁ଶሻ to measure 
the identity distance between any two faces ߁ଵ and  ߁ଶ, there 
cannot exist any face recognition software that measures 
identity distance with distሺ߁ଵ,  ߁ଶሻ to correctly recognize the 
subject of Γௗ as Γ. 
Proof. As stated, k-Diff-furthestሺሻ measures distሺ߁ଵ,  ߁ଶሻ in 
an AAM feature space as distሺΛଵ, Λଶሻ. The following proves 
that the de-identified face Λୢ ൌ k-Diff-furthestሺΛ௜, ݇ሻ for any Λ௜ א ۱௖ will be recognized as an original Λ௝ א ۱௙, i.e.  
 minஃೕא۱೑ሼdist൫Λ௝, Λୢ൯ሽ ൏ ݀݅ݏݐሺΛ௜, Λୢሻ (2). 
As demonstrated in Fig. 4, the shaded half of ۱௙ must 
contain at least an original face Λ௝ . Otherwise, the centroid Λ௙തതത 
would have shifted into the un-shaded half of ۱௙. Within the 
shaded half of ۱௙, the furthest point to Λୢ is Λ௙כ, giving that  
 minஃೕא۱೑ሼdist൫Λ௝, Λୢ൯ሽ ൑ dist൫Λ௙כ, Λୢ൯. (3) 
According to the Triangle Inequality Theorem, 
dist൫Λ௙כ, Λୢ൯ ൏ ݎ௙ ൅ dist൫Λୢ, Λ௙തതത൯ where dist൫Λୢ, Λ௙തതത൯ ൌ
distሺΛ௜, Λ௖തതതሻ ൑ ݎ௖ . 
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Λୢ
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r௖
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Λ௙
r௙
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b௜Λ௙כ
Therefore, 
 dist൫Λ௙כ, Λୢ൯ ൏ ݎ௙ ൅ ݎ௖ .  
The condition on line 15 of Fig. 2 
Diff-furthestሺሻ 
 ݎ௖ ൅ ݎ௙ ൑ dist൫Λ௖തതത, Λ௙തതത൯  
 Combining (3), (4) and (5) gives 
 minஃೕא۱೑൛dist൫Λ௝, Λୢ൯ൟ ൏ dist൫Λത
As illustrated in Fig. 3, (1) stands for 
Λ௜ א ۱௖. This gives distሺΛ௜, Λୢሻ ൌ distሺΛ௖തതത,
Equation (2) and hence Theorem 1 are 
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Although the k-Diff-furthest algorithm is proposed for 
neutral frontal faces only, additional measures can be applied 
to integrate the head poses, facial expressions and illumination 
of the original faces into the de-identified face image. For 
instance, replacing the single AAM in the k-Diff-furthest 
algorithm with a set of five view-based AAMs [10] will enable 
the algorithm to retain the horizontal head rotations in the de-
identified faces. In addition, a facial expression transfer scheme 
[11] has been developed for the restoration of original facial 
expressions on the de-identified faces, which can be directly 
applied to the de-identified faces generated by the k-Diff-
furthest algorithm. 
B. Perfect Privacy Protection by k-Diff-furthest 
1) Test design 
The privacy protection ability of the proposed k-Diff-
furthest algorithm is evaluated through recognition experiments 
using the Eigenface technique [12] in the AAM space, where 
the 40 original face images (all cropped) from the testing set 
are de-identified and the de-identified faces are then matched 
against all the original faces in the testing set. In the de-
identification process, the original face that triggers each 
iteration (line 3 of Fig. 2) is randomly selected. All results 
reported are based on running the identification process 1000 
times for each value of k.  
2) Test results 
Fig. 6 shows the rank-1 recognition rates of the de-
identified faces against their original faces. The k-Same-M 
algorithm is a k-Same-closest solution. But like k-Diff-furthest, 
it also performs face de-identification in the AAM space. As 
expected and confirmed in Fig. 6, the recognition rate of the k-
Same-M de-identified faces always stays synchronized with 
and just below the theoretical maximum of 1/݇. The same 
experimental results of recognition rate have been reported for 
all the other k-Same-closest face de-identification methods in 
their original papers [2, 3, 13], forcing all k-Same-closest 
methods to use large values of k in order to achieve acceptable 
privacy protection. The recognition rates of k-Diff-furthest 
faces on the other hand are significantly lower than those of the 
k-Same-M faces. Fig. 7 is a zoomed-in version of Fig. 6. Both 
Figs. 6 and 7 confirm that when single-member clusters are 
allowed, i.e. when all original faces satisfy condition (5), de-
identified faces generated by k-Diff-furthest always yield a 
recognition rate of zero regardless of the value of k. When 
single-member clusters are not allowed and when the steps 
defined by lines 23-29 in Fig. 2 are carried out, the last two 
(out of 40) original faces may lead to a correct matching with 
their de-identified versions. However, as shown in Figs. 6 and 
7, the probability for this to happen is lower than 0.4%. 
C. Distinguishable De-identified Faces by k-Diff 
1) Test design 
To measure how diverse a set of face images is, the 
Euclidean distance between each image and every other image 
in the set is computed in the AAM space. This is the distance 
measure used in Eigenface and many other face recognition 
techniques. It indicates how distinguishable the faces are in 
terms of the facial features displayed in the images. The 
smaller the distance between two face images, the harder it 
becomes to distinguish the two faces in the images. 
2) Test result and result analysis 
Fig. 8 shows the histogram distribution of the facial feature 
distances among the original testing face images as well as 
their de-identified face images generated by k-Same-closest, k-
Same-furthest and the proposed k-Diff-furthest when ݇ ൌ 5. k-
Same-M is again used as the representative k-Same-closest 
method. There are 40 face images in the testing set, meaning 
each histogram in Fig. 8 shows the distribution of ܥଶସ଴ ൌ 780 
facial feature distances. Table I lists the minimum, the 
maximum and the average distances as well as the standard 
deviation for each set of images. Calculation of standard 
deviation for both k-Same-closet and k-Same-furthest has 
excluded the distance at zero as this distance is given by 
repetitions of the same de-identified face. Fig. 9 illustrates the 
relationships between the computed facial feature distance and 
the visual difference displayed between the pair of face images. 
As shown in Fig. 8, the distance distributions of the original 
faces and the k-Diff-furthest (de-identified) faces have very 
similar outlines, indicating that the diversity of faces in terms 
of their facial features are kept through the k-Diff-furthest face 
de-identification process and hence the k-Diff-furthest faces are 
as distinguishable as their original faces. This is also confirmed 
by the results in Table I, where the two sets of face images 
have very similar average and maximum distances. The higher 
minimum distance from the k-Diff-furthest de-identified faces 
means that the most similar pair of k-Diff-furthest faces (Fig. 
9(d)) is more distinguishable than the most similar pair of 
original faces (Fig. 9(a)). The higher minimum value has also 
given k-Diff-furthest faces a slightly smaller standard deviation 
and a slightly more narrow distribution than the original faces. 
In contrast to those of the original and the k-Diff-furthest faces, 
the distance distributions for both the k-Same-closest and the k-
Same-furthest faces are much more discrete. This reflects the 
fact that k-Same methods de-identify a cluster of k original 
faces using the same de-identified face. This is also indicated 
by the spike at zero in both histograms. In addition, the de-
identified faces generated by k-Same methods are the centroids 
of clusters. The averaging effect of these de-identified faces 
has led to a much smaller maximum distance and a much more 
narrow distribution diagram for each k-Same method, implying 
that faces originally distinctively different have become much 
less distinguishable when being k-Same de-identified. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Recognition rates for de-identified faces aginst their original faces. 
Fig. 7. Recognition rates for k-Diff de-identified fac
faces. 
Fig. 8. Histogram of feature distances of original fac
de-identified faces when k=5. 
 
(I). Pairs of original faces 
(a) 7.84 (b) 12.76 
 
   
(II) Pairs of k-Diff-furthest de-identified faces with 
underneath them   
(d) 12.76 (e) 13.32 
 
   
    
Fig. 9. Example faces to show relationships between
feature distance and the visual difference displayed. 
feature distances are given in the labels for each pair of 
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